主 题：Dual Ownership and Risk-taking Incentives in Managerial Compensation
时 间：2019年9月24日（周二）18:30-20:00
地 点：浙江|9728太阳集团大学玉泉校区经济|9728太阳集团学院236会议室
主讲人：陈涛 新加坡南洋理工|9728太阳集团大学助理教授
主办方：浙江|9728太阳集团大学工程师|9728太阳集团学院互联网金融分院
浙江|9728太阳集团大学经济|9728太阳集团学院
协办方：浙江|9728太阳集团大学资产管理研究中心
浙江|9728太阳集团大学金融研究院
主讲人简介：
Tao Chen joined Nanyang Business School (NBS) as an Assistant Professor in Finance in 2014. His research interest focuses on how financial markets participants (e.g., analysts and institutional investors) impact corporate policies, which broadly includes corporate finance and corporate governance, mergers and acquisitions, tax avoidance, and banking and financial institutions.
He has published his work in Journal of Financial Economics, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Strategic Management Journal, Journal of Banking and Finance, and Journal of Corporate Finance.
Abstract:
This paper studies how conflicts between equity holders and bond holders affect the design of corporate managerial compensation. Firms with a higher ownership by institutional investors that simultaneously hold equity and bond of the firm (“dual holders”) adopt compensation policies with lower risk-taking incentives. Using financial-firm mergers that create dual holders for their portfolio companies as shocks, we identify a causal link between dual ownership and managerial compensation structure. Furthermore, dual holders vote on compensation-related managerial proposals in a way that reduces risk-taking incentives, compared with pure equity holders of the same firm.
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